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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 23, 35 and 77 of the
preliminary list*
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING
THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 22 June 1990 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of Palestine, to transmit to Your Excellency the statement issued by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the wake of the statement by H.E. Mr. George Bush, President of the United States of America, suspending the dialogue between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Government of the United States (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 23, 35 and 77 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zuhdi Labib TERZI
Permanent Observer of
Palestine to the United Nations

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Statement issued by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization

After one and a half years of the United States-Palestinian dialogue marking time and failing to address substantive matters because of a lack of seriousness in the United States position, President Bush has seen fit to break off the dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The United States decision to suspend the dialogue is incompatible with the responsible attitude that it might be presumed a great Power on the scale of the United States of America would adopt towards the peace process in the Middle East and world peace in general. This decision, moreover, strikes a blow against the entire peace process and against the credibility of the United States Administration.

The Palestinian leadership has adopted a clear and responsible position on the beach-landing operation advanced by the United States Administration as a pretext for the suspension of the dialogue with the PLO. The PLO has declared that neither it nor any of its organizations or forces were responsible for that operation. It has affirmed that it is the Palestine National Council (PNC), as the supreme authority over the members of the Executive Committee, which scrutinizes and ascertains the extent to which they adhere to and are bound by its resolutions at the national and international levels. The Palestinian leadership has further reaffirmed its commitment to the resolutions of the PNC and to the declaration of the President of the State of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee, Mr. Yasser Arafat, on the condemnation of terrorism in all its forms.

Despite that fact, the United States Administration has proceeded to take the step of suspending the dialogue. It thereby reveals the true nature of the objective that it sought to attain by exploiting the beach-landing operation in order to conduct a policy hostile to the Palestinian people and to its leadership, the PLO, a policy which denies the inalienable, legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, in the forefront of which is its right to self-determination. That policy emerged clearly in the course of the dialogue itself, where the United States side continued to adopt as its major premiss the non-recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the non-recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and continued to impede the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, including those relating to the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East.

The decision of the United States Administration was, most unfortunately, taken in deference to AIPAC and the Israeli Government, and it is a clear indication that Israel, with its accretions within the United States Administration, continues to control United States policy-making on the Middle East, just as the veto in the Security Council has been used at the official and public request of Israel.

The United States decision comes as the culmination of a series of United States positions that are partial to and supportive of Israel. In past years, the United States has opposed all attempts to mobilize international censure of Israel and has prevented the adoption of any resolutions by the Security Council condemning its crimes against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories or calling for their investigation. During the past year alone, it has used its power of veto in the Security Council seven times for this purpose. It has also brought diverse pressures to bear on a number of international organizations in order to protect Israel and its nefarious policies.

It has at all times continued to be the policy of the United States Administration to oppose and reject all serious initiatives for a start to the peace process, including the Palestinian peace initiative and United Nations and other international initiatives.

While the United States Administration reacts to an operation that cannot by any means be proved to have been directed against civilians and as a result of which not a single civilian was harmed, we have seen no such reaction on the part of the United States Administration to the crimes of Israel against Palestinian civilians or against Tunisians at Hammam Plage, to the assassination of the hero and martyr Abu Jihad surrounded by his children, to the massacre of Palestinian workers at Uyun Qarah ("Rishon Lezion") or other massacres in Gaza and the West Bank, or to the use by Israel of prohibited gases in confronting Palestinian children and causing Palestinian women to miscarry. We have not seen a single United States position adopted against the raids carried out by Israel on a daily basis for eight successive years by land, sea and air against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples in southern Lebanon, and it continues to commit such acts of aggression against Palestinian villages and camps in Lebanon.

At a time when the crimes of Israel's rulers, their intransigent attitude and their role in bringing about the failure of peace efforts and initiatives in the Middle East are being exposed to the entire international community, the United States decision against the PLO and the Palestinian people comes as an act of defiance to the will of the international community, protects Israel and its aggression and covers up Israel's responsibility for causing the failure of peace efforts.

The United States decision against the PLO also comes at a time when the Israeli crimes of repression against the Palestinian people with a view to crushing the intifadah are escalating, as are threats of war by the new Israeli Government against the neighbouring Arab countries, and the decision thus provides support and encouragement to the policy of war and aggression pursued by that Government. This runs counter to the trend in the international community towards increased reconciliation and détente and the extinction of hotbeds of tension in the world.

The decision taken by President Bush will prompt the rulers of Israel to persist in their aggressive policies, their crimes against the Palestinian people and their massacres within the occupied territory, and it will stimulate their appetite to continue to expand on Arab land, particularly in the light of the influx of waves of Jewish immigrants into the occupied Palestinian territory. Thus

the United States Administration cannot evade responsibility for encouraging Israel to persist in these hostile, criminal and expansionist policies.

The dialogue that the United States Administration has seen fit to break off was a step on the road to peace that had been prescribed by the will of the international community and by the Palestinian people and the enormous sacrifices which have affirmed its existence as a people and its rights against the usurpers. It was also enjoined by the enhanced standing of the PLO, the increased respect that it enjoys and its worthiness to participate in peace-making. It was required by the proclamation of the national political programme adopted by the PLO at the PNC meeting at Algiers in November 1988, by the Palestinian peace initiative that emerged from it and was announced by President Arafat at Geneva in December 1988, by the high sense of responsibility with which the PLO has addressed and will continue to address all international initiatives and efforts for peace and by the policy that has been the practice of the PLO and the masses of the Palestinian people of not being drawn into reacting to the terroristic and criminal actions being committed by the Israeli occupation authorities to which thousands have fallen victim, killed, wounded or incarcerated, and which have led to encroachment on Christian and Islamic Holy Places in Palestine.

The United States decision thus does not infringe upon the peace-making role of the PLO nor the international standing that it has worthily and deservedly acquired through the sacrifices of its people and of its freedom-fighters. It only diminishes and detracts from the role in the peace process of the United States of America itself when it breaks off contact with the major party without which peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East.

If, by means of this decision, the United States Administration was trying to repeat its previous attempts to assist the rulers of Israel to create alternatives to the PLO, it is in error. Together with the Israeli Government, it will discover that it can never find anyone among the Palestinian people to listen to it or to speak to it and that our people will cease all contact with Israeli and United States officials.

The decision taken by the United States Administration reflects the failure of the policy that it has been pursuing in addressing the peace issue in the Middle East. It is a policy based, on the one hand, on complete partiality towards Israel, the adoption of the Israeli viewpoint and the defence of Israel and its crimes and aggression and, on the other, on isolation and the alienation of other international parties and the organizations of the United Nations system.

The PLO, in revealing the character and dimensions of the United States decision, views it as a challenge to the recent Arab Summit Conference held at Baghdad and the resolutions it adopted and as a test of the will to resist and to reject United States blackmail that is reflected in those resolutions.

As has been its constant practice, the PLO has remained faithful to those resolutions and loyal to its commitment to them and to the concepts of steadfastness and national advancement that they embody. It has refused to submit to all the attempts at incitement and intimidation made by the United States

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Administration against the PLO and to attempts to render it amenable to schemes against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation.

The PLO and our heroic people with it have remained steadfast in all the defiant battles that they have waged and, after such a long hisotry of heroic struggle, there is no one who can make us bow down and surrender. Just as our people has remained steadfast in all of its previous battles, we will stand up to the challenge that the United States Administration seeks to impose upon us. Our people will be able to protect its valiant intifadah, to persist in it, to bring it to victory and to defend the PLO, its sole legitimate representative, until such time as our Palestinian flag is raised over Jerusalem, the capital of our independent Palestinian State.

The PLO, in calling for opposition to the United States decision and for its repercussions to be addressed, relies on the capacities of the Palestinian masses and their fighting ability and on the capability and determination of the Arab masses their national and pan-Arab forces and their great heritage of struggle.

Continuing and increasing Israeli aggression, protected by the encouragement of the United States, requires that our Arab nation should face the challenge with the summoning of the determination required and the adoption of a responsible pan-Arab position. It further requires that our Arab masses and their popular organizations should take the necessary measures to ensure that the Arab response is commensurate with the Zionist-American challenge.

The Arab States that adopted the Baghdad Summit resolutions are today further called upon to translate those resolutions into a confrontation of these challenges and to elaborate plans to give effect to Arab resolve and to make its presence felt and respected by the international community.

In precise terms, what is required by the United States decision, goes beyond the bounds of condemnation and censure. By its decision, the United States Administration has suspended its dealings with a member of the League of Arab States.

The PLO calls upon all international forces that cherish peace and justice to adopt a responsible attitude towards a United States decision that brings about a deterioration of the situation in the Middle East region, removes all chances for peace, protects and encourages the hostile and terroristic objectives of the new Shamir Government and thus impels the region into a new war and wide-scale eruption.

It further calls upon all international forces to work assiduously for the convening of the International Peace Conference as the framework that can ensure the achievement of a just and comprehensive solution.

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THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 21 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a message from the Loya Jirgah of the people of Afghanistan addressed to you in connection with the political settlement of the issues in and around Afghanistan (see annex).

I have further the honour to request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 29, 71 and 144 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Noor Ahmad NOOR
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Message from the Loya Jirgah of the people of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

First of all, we would like to extend the deepest gratitude of the people of Afghanistan, through the High Tribune of the Loya Jirgah, dated 28 and 29 May 1990, for your effective efforts in connection with the political settlement of the issues in and around Afghanistan.

In the light of the fresh developments in the world and in the Afghan society, expansion of national reconciliation and proposals received from various sources, the Loya Jirgah endorsed some amendments to the Constitution which pave the way for a broader intra-Afghan understanding and extension of democracy. The first article of the amended Constitution has enshrined the Islamic character of Afghanistan.

Moreover, the privileged position of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan embodied in the preamble of the former constitution has been omitted and political pluralism has been recognized as the basis for future political system of the country.

Principles have been set for general, equal, free, secret and direct elections, and the judges and the attorneys declared to be impartial and non-party people. Investigation has been envisaged to be made into the allegations levelled against senior State authorities. Those who themselves or their wives are not from Afghan parents cannot be employed in high military and civilian posts and as diplomatic employees, according to the amendments.

The sphere for socio-economic activities of the private sector has been broadened and the monopoly or control of the State over these spheres have ceased or scaled down.

Taking into consideration the national interests of Afghanistan, foreign investments are encouraged and the creation of foreign ventures, banks and educational institutions are allowed, favourable grounds have been envisaged for achieving the legal status of permanent neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan.

The Loya Jirgah supported the mechanism proposed by the President of Afghanistan aimed at meeting the appeal and demand of the Afghan people through the United Nations-sponsored general, free, equal, secret and direct elections; under this mechanism, a period has been scheduled for cooling down the situation for providing preliminary conditions for dialogue which include a referendum, a partial or complete cease-fire and return of the refugees.

With the start of dialogue, a transitional period will begin and will continue until a new elected government is formed.

In the course of this period, a national peace conference will be called and commissions will come into being for preparation of the elections and drafting the Constitution and the Law on Elections. A Loya Jirgah will be held to ratify the Constitution and elect the President.

Parliamentary elections will be arranged according to the law and a new elected government acceptable to all will be formed to take over the affairs.

A United Nations-supervised international conference shall be called to tackle the external dimensions of the issue and to reach agreement on a symmetrical ban of arms injections to all the warring sides, meticulous observance of the Geneva agreements, the legal status of permanent neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan, and search of international aid for the revival of the country.

Deeply convinced of the valuable role of the United Nations in the solution of the international questions, the Loya Jirgah of the people of Afghanistan deem it proper to ask once again, through you, a more active contribution by those who think about the question of peace and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Loya Jirgah of the people of Afghanistan considers it befitting to express gratitude for the international economic and humanitarian assistance rendered to the people of Afghanistan under the supervision of the United Nations.

The new dispositions here in Afghanistan, which are the yields of the new responsible approach of the leadership and people of Afghanistan towards the country's destiny and the latest world developments, have candled the hope for a genuine progress towards the political solution of the Afghan issue. In the same way, the growing role of the United Nations in solving the regional and world disputes convinces the world public on the political settlement of the Afghan question to the futility of the notion of a military solution.

The complete Soviet troop pull-out, in conformity with the Geneva agreements, as a realistic and correct combination of the policies and measures of the State of Afghanistan with Islamic values, national traditions and the contemporary world requirements, has succeeded in the best way to heighten the level of understanding, dialogue and negotiation between the State and the opposition.

Realization of the national reconciliation and presentation of concrete and practical proposals, mainly aimed at forming a government through free, fair, equal, general and direct elections under United Nations supervision demonstrate the sincere attitude and good will of the State of Afghanistan for establishing, immediately, peace and security in the country. As the highest manifestation of the people's will and determination, the Loya Jirgah believes that the State of Afghanistan, under the leadership of President Najibulla, will make efforts, in line with its honest and flexible policies for the implementation of the Geneva Agreements and resolutions of the General Assembly, for expanding the process of national reconciliation and a national dialogue among Afghans. The State is to harmonize its measures devoted to ceasing war and blood-letting in the country with the measures of the United Nations. The people of Afghanistan know well that the continuation of your good offices will speed up the solution of the issue.

Therefore, we participants of the present Loya Jirgah are turning to your endeavours for accelerating the search for a political solution and to help our people in ceasing the war and attracting international assistance for their socio-economic rehabilitation. A peaceful, neutral and demilitarized Afghanistan is in line with the interests and demands of Afghans, and all the world and regional countries.

Please accept the acknowledgement of the participants of the Loya Jirgah for your continued efforts concerning Afghanistan.

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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 25 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, the text of a memorandum, entitled "Manoeuvre of Viet Nam and the Vietnamese-installed régime in Phnom Penh aimed at rejecting the quadripartism and imposing the bipartism in the inter-Cambodian negotiations", which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990 (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Memorandum adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990

Manoeuvre of Viet Nam and the Vietnamese-installed régime in Phnom Penh aimed at rejecting the quadripartism and imposing the bipartism in the inter-Cambodian negotiations

For already more than 11 years, the Cambodian people and Cambodia, an independent, neutral and non-aligned country, have been victims of the Vietnamese aggression. In order to bring this conflict to an end, the National Government of Cambodia (NGC) and the Cambodian National Resistance (CNR) have urged Viet Nam, a party to the conflict, to negotiate directly with them with a view to seeking a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian problem, created by the Vietnamese aggression and occupation. Nevertheless, in their willingness to put an end as soon as possible to the war and unspeakable sufferings of the Cambodian people, the three components of the NGC and CNR, under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, have decided to make magnanimous concessions by accepting to consider the Vietnamese-installed régime in Phnom Penh as a party to peace negotiations. That is the reason which has led the four Cambodian parties to take part in the Jakarta Informal Meetings in 1988-1989-1990, the quadripartite meeting at La Celle-Saint-Cloud (France) in July 1989 and the Paris International Conference on Cambodia in July and August 1989.

It is also with the same spirit of compromise so as to arrive at a peaceful solution to the Cambodian problem in the framework of an overall political settlement, and in response to the wish expressed by the Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council to see a resumption of a constructive dialogue among the four Cambodian factions, that H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk put forward, on 4 April 1990, a proposal calling for a quadripartite meeting, and that the three parties of the CNR took part in the Tokyo meeting on 4 and 5 June 1990.

But instead of appreciating at its true value the goodwill that the NGC and the CNR have displayed in this regard, Viet Nam and its Phnom Penh régime have hardened their positions, and gone so far as to oppose negotiations among the four Cambodian parties, and demanded that the talks in Tokyo be held only between two parties, namely, the National Government of Cambodia and the régime installed in Phnom Penh by Viet Nam.

Therefore, Viet Nam and its Phnom Penh régime have done nothing but to impede all efforts made by H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Cambodia and the CNR, and by the three parties of the NGC and the CNR, aimed at restoring independence and peace in Cambodia, by resorting ceaselessly to dilatory manoeuvres.

What are the aims of those manoeuvres?

They are aimed at:

1. Imposing the recognition of the Phnom Penh régime, creation and creature of Viet Nam, as a legitimate government of Cambodia in the same way as the National Government of Cambodia (NGC) recognized by the United Nations and the international community;

2. Making people believe that the Vietnamese war of aggression and occupation came to an end with the so-called "total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces" on 27 September 1990;

3. Presenting the war which is currently going on in Cambodia as a civil war between two Cambodian parties or two Cambodian governments;

4. Splitting up the National Government of Cambodia and the Cambodian National Resistance by trying to eliminate from the political settlement process of the conflict between Viet Nam and Cambodia, the Democratic Kampuchea party which has carried out, together with the other two parties, the national liberation struggle, and that the Vietnamese forces have failed for already more than 11 years to eliminate through military means.

Should Viet Nam and its Phnom Penh régime succeed in those manoeuvres:

1. Cambodia would be partitioned in two;

2. The numerous treaties, conventions and accords prepared by Viet Nam and signed by the Phnom Penh régime would become valid with all political, juridical consequences which would jeopardize the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, in particular:

(a) The acceptance to place Cambodia under the Vietnamese occupation in the framework of the "Indochina Federation";

(b) The alienation of an important part of Cambodian national territory already annexed by Viet Nam;

(c) The validation of the so-called "Cambodian citizenship" given by Viet Nam through the Phnom Penh régime to several hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese nationals illegally settled in Cambodia in violation of the 12 August 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war;

(d) The formal recognition of the presence in Cambodia of tens of thousands of Vietnamese forces concealed or disguised under the uniforms of the soldiers of the Phnom Penh régime, and that of Vietnamese cadres who have been in fact directing the administrative apparatus of the Phnom Penh régime at all levels;

(e) The acceptance by the NGC and the CNR of the Vietnamese aggression and occupation and the "Vietnamization" of Cambodia as a fait accompli.

* * *

The manoeuvres of Viet Nam and its Phnom Penh régime aimed at artificially reducing the number of the Cambodian parties from four to two, constitute a major obstacle for peace negotiations, which are only to prolong the war.

The NGC and the CNR appeal to all countries committed to peace and justice resolutely to oppose these manoeuvres and to call upon Viet Nam to accept a comprehensive political settlement of the so-called "Cambodian problem" created by its aggression and occupation on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions on the situation in Cambodia and the summary of conclusions of the meetings of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, in particular, those of the meetings of 15 and 16 January and 25 to 26 May 1990.

The three components of the NGC and the CNR are ready to participate in the work of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to which the four Cambodian parties will be invited at the forthcoming meeting scheduled for July in Paris.

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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 25 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, the text of a memorandum, entitled "Manoeuvre of Viet Nam and the régime installed in Phnom Penh by Viet Nam on the cease-fire", which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990 (see annex).

I should be very grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Memorandum adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990

Manoeuvre of Viet Nam and the régime installed in Phnom Penh by Viet Nam on the cease-fire

1. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

In the historical precedents of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the "cessation of hostilities in Indochina" and the 1973 Paris Agreement on "ending the war and restoring peace in Viet Nam", the cease-fires were part of the overall settlements of the problems at that time. In the afore-cited cases, the cease-fires were followed by the withdrawal of foreign forces within 90 days as of the date when the Agreement came into force. To ensure that the cease-fires were respected by all parties, an international control was instituted through an "International Commission of Control and Supervision". The foreign forces were confined into barracks, following the cease-fire, before being withdrawn. Therefore, there was no cease-fire without international control.

Furthermore, all those agreements have been deliberately violated by Viet Nam. That is why, in a comprehensive political settlement on Cambodia, it is absolutely indispensable that, inter alia, the withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces and the cease-fire be controlled and supervised by a United Nations international control mechanism and a United Nations peace-keeping force.

2. CURRENT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

There has not been, on the contrary, an effective withdrawal of the Vietnamese armed forces from Cambodia as deceitfully claimed by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

At present, nearly 100,000 Vietnamese soldiers wearing the uniforms of the Phnom Penh régime's army and militia, as well as in regular units, continue to fight against the National Government of Cambodia (NGC) and the Cambodian National Resistance (CNR) headed by H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. These facts have been confirmed by the Vietnamese soldiers captured on the battlefield, and amply substantiated by numerous pieces of evidence and impartial studies. According to a report of 26 April 1990 prepared by the "Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare - House Republican Research Committee of the US House of Representatives", the number of Vietnamese troops stationing in Cambodia by mid-April 1990, was estimated as high as 64,340 to 66,740 (see appendix).

Since October 1989, in order to withstand the offensives mounted by the CNR, Viet Nam has successively sent new reinforcements in order to prop up at arm's length the shattering régime in Phnom Penh, as pointed out in the resolution of the Economic and Social Council adopted on 22 May 1990 which mentioned the subsequent reports of the return of foreign forces into Cambodia.

The return of the Vietnamese forces to Cambodia has been widely reported, notably in the London-based Jane's Defense weekly of 10 February 1990, The New York Times of 23 February 1990, the International Herald Tribune of 22 February 1990, The Guardian of London of 24 February 1990 and Le Monde of 9 February 1990, to cite only a few. The presence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia engaging in combat against the CNR is irrefutable.

Given these conditions, it would be unjust to impose a cease-fire in Cambodia, thus depriving the Cambodian people of their sacred right to carry out their struggle for national liberation to recover the independence of Cambodia and to restore peace.

The NGC and the CNR together with all countries committed to peace and justice have reiterated their willingness to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions on the situation in Cambodia and the summary of conclusions of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The latter have looked into this problem since their Paris Meeting in January 1990, followed by three other meetings, the fourth being held in New York on 25 and 26 May 1990. In the last summary of conclusions, the Five clearly reaffirmed that "only a comprehensive political settlement will bring lasting peace and stability to Cambodia", and that a comprehensive political settlement must include specific provisions (see A/45/322-S/21373, para. 2).

Despite this legitimate demand of the world community, Viet Nam and the régime installed by Viet Nam in Phnom Penh have tried desperately to impose a cease-fire without United Nations monitoring. Through this manoeuvre, they aim at making people believe that the aggression war in Cambodia is a civil war and at deceiving the world community into accepting the Vietnamese fait accompli. Another objective is to give credence to a thesis according to which all the Vietnamese forces have already been pulled out of Cambodia.

In these conditions, to accept a cease-fire would be tantamount to renouncing the sacred struggle of national liberation that has been carried out for already more than 11 years to recover our independence and to restore peace within the territorial integrity of Cambodia. That would also amount to enabling the Vietnamese aggressors and the régime installed by Viet Nam in Phnom Penh to obtain on the negotiating table what they have failed to achieve on the battlefield. The NGC and the CNR as well as the world community cannot allow that situation to happen. In the case of a cease-fire without effective control and supervision, Viet Nam will continue to maintain its forces in Cambodia and to dispatch overtly or covertly reinforcements to perpetuate its occupation of Cambodia.

The cessation of hostilities through an effective cease-fire in Cambodia is an ardent wish of the Cambodian people and their National Government of Cambodia as well as the CNR, being victims of foreign aggression and occupation. However, the cease-fire should be part of a comprehensive solution to the problem if it is to be durable, and would become effective only at the time that an interim administration authority takes office, and the United Nations international control mechanism and the United Nations peace-keeping force becomes operational.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew our firm and unreserved support to the summary of conclusions of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. We appeal to all peace- and justice-loving countries to continue supporting a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cambodia and the summary of conclusions of the Five. In so doing, they will undoubtedly bring an invaluable contribution not only to the achievement of the just cause of the Cambodian people but also to the maintenance of world peace and security.

APPENDIX

Excerpts from "Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare" - House Republican Research Committee - US House of Representatives, 26 April 1990

"... The current deployment of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia was accomplished in two phases. The first phase was accomplished during the 'withdrawal' of late 1989. Major PAVN units, and a few subordinate subunits, were left behind in key strategic locations. ... The second phase involved the still continuing insertion of small units into Cambodia to consolidate positions and garrisons in key military installations. From there, the PAVN subunits, independently or with subordinate RPKAF (Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea) subunits, deploy to small posts and garrisons in the countryside, gradually expanding the area controlled by Hanoi and displacing the rural population ...

"The current deployment of PAVN forces and their RPKAF subordinates ... are controlled from a Corps Headquarters in south-east Pursat province where 7,000 PAVN troops are deployed. In early March 1990, the Corps Headquarters was in command of approximately 46,970 to 45,370 PAVN troops ...

"The parts of Cambodia dominated by the Corps are divided into two strategic echelons (S.E.): The Western command is the 1st S.E., which is divided into two Fronts. The northern Front is devoted to dealing with the freedom fighters operating from Thailand. The southern Front is devoted to securing the main lines of communication from southern Vietnam and the Cambodian shore line. The 2nd S.E. is the Eastern command which is devoted to controlling the Cambodian interior and especially ground and river transportation.

"This command structure remained intact even during the height of the Vietnamese 'withdrawal'. Indeed, the Corps Headquarters and its approximately 7,000 troops remained inside Cambodia well into late-1989, with control of the northern Front of the 1st S.E. accomplished by two 'stay-behind' PAVN Regiments (1,200 and 3,000 troops respectively). These regiments, in turn, controlled 3 RPKAF divisions (286th, 5th and 81st) with PAVN core elements, as well as 2 RPKAF divisions (190th and 4th) with only PAVN special forces elements, all deployed along the Thai border. The control of the southern Front of the 1st S.E. was accomplished through a single 'stay-behind' PAVN Regiment (5,000 troops specialized in internal security). This regiment also controlled 2 RPKAF divisions with PAVN core elements deployed along the Tonle River. During the 'withdrawal', the control of the 2nd S.E. was accomplished through 2 PAVN Regiments (3,000 troops each) in the eastern Kompong Cham province near the Vietnamese border. A RPKAF division with a PAVN core unit in the center of the province was subordinated to this force. All together, approximately 27,060 troops remained in this deployment in Cambodia when the 'withdrawal' was completed."

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25 June 1990
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 32 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 25 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, the text of a memorandum, entitled "Why does Viet Nam reject peace efforts on Cambodia of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council?", which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990 (see annex).

I should be very grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Memorandum adopted by the Council of Ministers of the National Government of Cambodia on 17 June 1990

Why does Viet Nam reject peace efforts on Cambodia of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council?

1. Since January this year, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have conducted a series of meetings on Cambodia. They adopted on 16 January 1990 the 16-point principles for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem, in conformity with the relevant United Nations resolutions on Cambodia over the past 11 years. They have elaborated modalities for a settlement involving an enhanced United Nations role in Cambodia.

2. During their last meeting of 25 and 26 May 1990 in New York, the Five reiterated that "only a comprehensive political settlement will bring lasting peace and stability to Cambodia", and that "a comprehensive political settlement must include specific provisions: (see A/45/293-S/21318, annex, pp. 2-3).

> "(a) To ensure the verification of the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of external military assistance, a durable cease-fire, the regrouping of the armed forces of the factions into designated cantonment areas, all under the control of an effective United Nations peace-keeping operation;
>
> "(b) To establish formally a supreme national council;
>
> "(c) To ensure free and fair elections for a constituent assembly under United Nations auspices;
>
> "(d) To enshrine the fundamental human rights and freedoms which the Cambodian people must enjoy, together with the necessary protections and guarantees;
>
> "(e) To provide a system of guarantees for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia.".

3. All these efforts of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have been flatly rejected by Viet Nam which has instead been trying to impose a cease-fire without a comprehensive political settlement and the United Nations control and supervision, thus preventing the Cambodian people from carrying out their sacred struggle for national liberation and independence.

4. Why is Viet Nam so desperately opposed to the legitimate demand of the world community and the Five to bring about a comprehensive political settlement to the Cambodian problem involving an enhanced United Nations role? This can only be explained by the fact that:

(a) Viet Nam is not ready to relinquish its strategy of annexing Cambodia into its "Indochina Federation";

(b) Viet Nam still maintains nearly 100,000 of its troops in Cambodia, and continues to dispatch new reinforcements to fight against the Cambodian National Resistance. And more than one million Vietnamese settlers continue to stay in Cambodia.

According to the report of 26 April 1990 of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare - House Republican Research Committee - US House of Representatives, the number of Vietnamese troops stationing in Cambodia by mid-April 1990 was estimated as high as 64,370 to 66,740 men;

(c) Viet Nam tries hard to keep the Vietnamese-installed régime in place as a smoke-screen to perpetuate its occupation of Cambodia.

By opposing United Nations control and supervision and by trying to keep in place its Phnom Penh régime, Viet Nam wants to conceal its forces in Cambodia and to pursue its occupation of the country.

5. Should Viet Nam succeed in its manoeuvres, would the Cambodian people be able to determine their own destiny or exercise their right to self-determination? Would the elections be free, fair and democratic? Would regional peace, security and stability be safeguarded?

If Viet Nam has really nothing to hide in Cambodia, it has no reason to fear the control and supervision to be carried out by the United Nations international control mechanism and the United Nations peace-keeping force, which will be entrusted with other mandates, including the prevention of any one Cambodian party from abusing its forces to monopolize power or to dominate the other Cambodian parties.

6. With a view to contributing to an early restoration of peace and independence in Cambodia and to promoting national reconciliation among Cambodians, the three components of the National Government of Cambodia and the Cambodian National Resistance renew their full support to the summary of conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem, and are ready to participate in the work of the Five to which the four Cambodian parties will be invited at the next meeting scheduled for July 1990 in Paris.

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NATIONS

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S/21374
26 June 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 25 JUNE 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement dated 22 June 1990 by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

I should be grateful if you would have it distributed as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. VORONTSOV

Annex

STATEMENT BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

On 20 June the United States announced that it was suspending the dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). As justification for its decision, it cited the absence of an adequate reaction on the part of the PLO to the operation mounted by Palestinian militants off the Israeli coast on 30 May 1990.

It is generally known that, at its nineteenth session, in Algiers, the Palestine National Council declared that it renounced terrorism. As for the above-mentioned operation of 30 May, the PLO leadership has officially disavowed any involvement in it. Accordingly, we regard the decision of the American Administration as regrettable.

The United States action must be viewed in the context of the present deteriorating situation in the Middle East. It is obvious that the dialogue between the United States and the PLO, which is pursuing a realistic and constructive course in Middle East affairs, could, for all its limited character, serve as one means of furthering the peace process in that region, the need for which is being felt now more than ever. The ending of the dialogue could play into the hands of those forces which have no interest in achieving peace in the Middle East, and could lead to even greater tension, which would be fraught with unforeseeable consequences.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 32 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 26 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, the statement issued on 17 June 1990 by the Spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of Cambodia on the Angkor peace zone (see annex).

I should be very grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Statement issued on 17 June 1990 by the Spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of Cambodia on the Angkor peace zone

The National Government of Cambodia would like to point out once again the issue of the Angkor peace zone, as follows:

1. Over the past more than 11 years, the Angkor zone, like Cambodia as a whole, has suffered serious destructions caused by the Vietnamese aggressors and their puppets. As far as the Angkor Wat and other many century-old monuments, the Cambodian national cultural heritage, are concerned, the Vietnamese aggressors and their puppets have plundered a great many statues and other objets d'art, sent them to Viet Nam or to international markets. In addition, they have fired bullets and committed other acts of vandalism causing great damage in many places of those monuments. Such despicable acts square fully with their policy to eliminate the Cambodian national cultural heritage in conformity with the "Vietnamization" of Cambodia. Even trees in the surrounding areas of those monuments have not been spared by the Vietnamese aggressors, who have felled them and transported them to Viet Nam.

2. The National Government of Cambodia (NGC) and the Cambodian National Resistance (CNR) headed by H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, have time and again brought this matter to the attention of the world community.

For their part, the NGC and CNR have done their utmost to protect and preserve the monuments they have liberated.

Furthermore, in our activities at Siemreap front, we have done nothing that could harm the Angkor monuments, and we have never carried out the fighting in the Angkor compounds.

The sole objective of our current struggle has been and continues to be the liberation of Cambodia, including the Angkor Wat monument, one of the monuments of the historic cultural heritage of Cambodia and of mankind, as well as other monuments currently under Vietnamese occupation.

3. The NGC and CNR have on many occasions called for the setting up of the Angkor peace zone. Here again, we would like to reiterate that proposal, with the following concrete steps to be taken:

First, the withdrawal from the Angkor zone of all the armed forces, including the Vietnamese occupying forces, who are now stationed in the forests within the Angkor compounds and in the monuments themselves;

Second, the deployment in the Angkor peace zone of the staff of the United Nations international control mechanism, who will, with the participation of the representatives of the four Cambodian parties, verify that no armed forces remain in the declared neutral zone;

Third, after the withdrawal of all the armed forces and once the staff of the United Nations international control mechanism is deployed in the peace zone, the NGC and CNR will welcome the international community for the work of preservation and restoration of the Angkor monuments.

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/21376
27 June 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 621 (1988) of 20 September 1988, by which it decided to authorize the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Western Sahara and to request the Secretary-General to transmit to it as soon as possible a report on the holding of a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and on ways and means to ensure the organization and supervision of such a referendum by the United Nations in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity,

Recalling also that, on 30 August 1988, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro gave their agreement in principle to the proposals of the United Nations Secretary-General and the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity in the framework of their joint mission of good offices,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/21360),

1. Expresses its full support to the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices, pursued jointly with the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, with a view to settling the question of Western Sahara;

2. Approves the report of the Secretary-General, transmitted to the Security Council in accordance with resolution 621 (1988) with a view to settling the question of Western Sahara, which contains the full text of the settlement proposals as accepted by the two parties on 30 August 1988 as well as an outline of the plan provided by the Secretary-General in order to implement those proposals;

3. Calls upon the two parties to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity in their efforts aimed at an early settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

4. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to dispatch, in the immediate future, a technical mission to the territory and to neighbouring countries, in particular to refine the administrative aspects of the outlined plan and to obtain the necessary information for the preparation of a further report to the Security Council;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Security Council as soon as possible a further detailed report on his implementation plan, containing in particular an estimate of the cost of the United Nations Mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), on the understanding that this further report should be the basis on which the Security Council would authorize the establishment of MINURSO.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/21377
27 June 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 JUNE 1990 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the statement of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan issued in Kabul dated 25 June 1990.

I have further the honour to request that the present statement be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad E. ROSHAN-RAWAAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Statement dated 25 June 1990 by the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan

In recent days, the flagrant encroachments of the air force of Pakistan into the air space of the Republic of Afghanistan have unprecedently increased. For instance, in the past two days the jet planes of the air force of Pakistan have intruded several times in the air space of the Republic of Afghanistan from the directions of Arenda, Para Chinar, Baricot Village, Asmare District of Kunar Province and south of Jalalabad and have penetrated up to 50 kms inside the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan.

In continuation of its protests over the earlier aggressions of Pakistani airplanes in the air space of the Republic of Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Embassy of Pakistan and lodged with him, and through him with the Government of Pakistan, the strongest protest of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan on these flagrant violations.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan once again states that the continuation of such violations which run counter to all international norms and that of the letter and spirit of the Geneva accords to which the Government of Pakistan is a signatory, will result in grave and dangerous consequences. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan in case of the repetition of such infringements and aggressions reserves the right for the defence of the country's national sovereignty with all available means.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan calls on all countries of the world, the United Nations and all peaceful organizations and circles of the world to exert pressure on Pakistan to refrain from the continuation of such dangerous provocations which pose an ever-increasing threat to peace and security in the region. Otherwise, the dangerous consequences arising from such instigations will rest with the Government of Pakistan.

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S/21378
27 June 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 23, 35 and 77 of the preliminary list*
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 26 June 1990 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of Palestine, to bring the following to your immediate attention:

> Again, the Israeli border guard attacked the village of Silwan, near Jerusalem, on 20 June 1990; killing three Palestinians of the ages 25, 17 and 57, and injuring ten of the residents of the village. The vicious attack of the Israeli army was carried out by the use of both live ammunition and rubber bullets, as well as a massive amount of tear gas that was used against the Palestinian unarmed civilians of the village of Silwan. The attack lasted for the consecutive period of two days non-stop. Currently, the village is under curfew.

We call upon the international community to take immediate action to stop Israel, the occupying Power, from continuing its atrocities against the Palestinian people. We further request that a statement be issued by the office of the

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* A/45/50.

Secretary-General condemning such acts of violence and calling upon Israel to abide by its legal international obligations, in conformity with the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the International Conventions on Human Rights.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 23, 35 and 77 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zuhdi Labib TERZI
Permanent Observer of
Palestine to the United Nations

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21379
29 June 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 656 (1990) of 8 June 1990, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it fully informed of further developments relating to the demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance and in particular to report to it not later than 29 June concerning the completion of the demobilization process.

2. I am happy to be able to inform the Security Council that, at 1900 hours local time on 28 June 1990, demobilization had been completed at all locations, except for one in Nicaragua where a handful of members of the Nicaraguan Resistance remained to be demobilized; their demobilization was expected to be completed today, whereupon the location in question (zone 8) was to be closed. The Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) has reported that he has received from the commander of each of the four "fronts" of the Nicaraguan Resistance (Northern, Central, Southern, Atlantic) a document in which the commander concerned certifies that all combatants under his command have been demobilized; that all arms, ammunition and military equipment have been handed over to ONUCA and no such material has been hidden; and that either the military structure of the front concerned has been dissolved (Atlantic and Central Fronts) or the front has definitively abandoned the armed struggle (Northern Front) or it has converted itself into a political force (Southern Front). General Quesada has also received a letter from the Minister of the Presidency of the Nicaraguan Government which, in the name of the President of Nicaragua, states that the Nicaraguan Government, in the light of the results achieved and of the certificates signed by the leaders of the various fronts of the Nicaraguan Resistance, is fully satisfied with the process of demobilization that ONUCA has carried out in fulfilment of its mandate.

3. The members of the Security Council will recall that demobilization began in Honduras on 16 April 1990. It took place at four locations in that country: Danlí, La Kiatara, Yamales and Zacatal. The numbers of armed and unarmed members of the Resistance who were demobilized at each of these locations are set out in annex I to the present report.

4. As regards Nicaragua, demobilization in that country began on 8 May 1990 but proceeded slowly until the signature of the Managua Protocol on 30 May 1990. Eight security zones were established for the purpose, zones 1 to 5 being for the members of the Northern and Central Fronts, zones 6 and 7 for the Atlantic Front and zone 8 for the Southern Front. The senior commanders of the Nicaraguan Resistance, together with members of their staff, travelled from zone 5 to the village of San Pedro de Lovago on 27 June 1990 and were demobilized there by ONUCA on the same day in a final ceremony attended by the President of Nicaragua, members of her Government and the Archbishop of Managua. A temporary demobilization post was established at El Cedro on 20 June 1990 when ONUCA was made aware of the presence of some stragglers who had not reported to the security zones in that area before they were closed; demobilization continued there up to 28 June 1990. In addition, 15 members of the Nicaraguan Resistance reported for demobilization to the ONUCA verification centre at Estelí. The totals of armed and unarmed members of the Nicaraguan Resistance who were demobilized at each of the above locations are set out in annex II to the present report.

5. Members of the Nicaraguan Resistance were deemed to be armed if they presented themselves for demobilization with a weapon or some other item of ordnance, such as mines or hand grenades. Individuals not so equipped were considered to be members of the Nicaraguan Resistance, and therefore eligible for demobilization, if they were in uniform and had been certified by a commander of a Resistance unit as being members of the Nicaraguan Resistance. Some of these personnel were wounded or disabled ex-combatants; others were said to have served in the Nicaraguan Resistance in a non-combatant capacity (e.g., logistics support).

6. Annex III to the present report sets out totals for the different categories of weapons that were handed over by the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Honduras and Nicaragua respectively, up to and including 28 June 1990. These were destroyed on the spot by ONUCA, as agreed. ONUCA was informed both by senior officers of the Nicaraguan Army and by the leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance themselves that the Resistance had always been a lightly armed and mobile force that hardly ever deployed heavy weapons inside Nicaragua. ONUCA nevertheless paid special attention to two categories of heavy weapons that were reported to be in the possession of the Nicaraguan Resistance, namely heavy machine-guns and surface-to-air missiles.

7. As indicated in annex III, four heavy machine-guns were handed in. The leader of the Northern Front confirmed to ONUCA that his front had received heavy machine-guns in the past but said that they had been used only for the defence of the front's bases in Honduras. All the weapons had been returned to the original supplier before the members of the front came back to Nicaragua in April and May 1990. I have been given reason to believe that some of these weapons were disposed of in this way but that the bulk of them were known to have become unserviceable.

8. As regards surface-to-air missiles, 84 "Redeye" and 28 "SAM-7" missiles were handed over to ONUCA. On the basis of consultations with various parties who might be in a position to form an estimate of the number of such weapons in the possession of the Nicaraguan Resistance at the time that demobilization began,

these figures approximate closely to what was expected. As reported above, the commanders of all the fronts have solemnly assured ONUCA, both orally and in writing, that no arms or military equipment remain under their command or have been hidden.

9. As the process of demobilization neared its close, the strength of the Venezuelan battalion, which had performed its tasks with great distinction, was gradually reduced. Two groups, accounting for more than half its strength, have already been repatriated to Venezuela. The withdrawal of the battalion will be completed by 4 July.

10. In conclusion, I would like to record my appreciation to the Security Council for its two decisions to enlarge the mandate of ONUCA and then to extend the deadline for the completion of demobilization. In taking those decisions, the Security Council enabled ONUCA to play a role in helping to bring to an end the tragic war which had inflicted many casualties and much hardship on the region, and in particular on the Nicaraguan people, during the last decade. I would also wish to record my gratitude to the President of Nicaragua, to the Nicaraguan civilian and military authorities and to the Archbishop of Managua for the co-operation they have extended to ONUCA in carrying out its tasks. Similarly, I wish to express my gratitude to the President of Honduras and to the civilian and military authorities of that country for the co-operation extended to ONUCA during the demobilization process there.

Annex I

Members of the Nicaraguan Resistance demobilized in Honduras

Location	Armed	Unarmed	Total
Danli	-	456	456
La Kiatara	217	78	295
Yamales a/	-	1 457	1 457
Zacatal a/	-	399	399
Total	217	2 390	2 607

a/ Although all the personnel demobilized at Yamales and Zacatal were unarmed, 384 weapons were handed over separately to ONUCA at Yamales and 41 at Zacatal. They are included in the totals in annex III.

Annex II

Members of the Nicaraguan Resistance demobilized in Nicaragua

Location	Armed	Unarmed	Total
Zone 1	2 108	138	2 246
Zone 2	1 220	413	1 633
Zone 3	2 150	405	2 555
Zone 4	3 067	172	3 239
Zone 5 a/	5 072	1 241	6 313
Zone 6	1 335	105	1 440
Zone 7	147	25	172
Zone 8	972	582	1 554
El Cedro	86	3	89
VC Estelí	14	1	15
Total	16 171	3 085	19 256

a/ The figures for zone 5 include those demobilized at San Pedro de Lovago on 27 June 1990.

Annex III

Weapons handed over to ONUCA by members of the Nicaraguan Resistance

Type of weapon	Honduras	Nicaragua	Total
Small arms (includes AK 47s, other assault rifles, rifles and light machine-guns)	512	14 408	14 920
Heavy machine-guns	2	2	4
Mortars (includes light and medium mortars)	28	106	134
Grenade launchers (includes RPG-7s and LAWs)	83	1 182	1 265
Grenades (all types)	570	740	1 310
Mines (all types)	4	134	138
Missiles	30 (2 "Redeye") (28 SAM-7s)	82 ("Redeye")	112

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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA
QUESTION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF
GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS BETWEEN
STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 2 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, the text of an interview on the outcome of the Sino-Vietnamese talks granted on 21 June 1990 by Mr. Tran Quang Co, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister to the Viet Nam News Agency (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 32, 38, 71 and 142 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) TRINH XUAN LANG
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Interview on the recent Sino-Vietnamese talks granted on 21 June 1990 by the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister to the Viet Nam News Agency

Question 1: Public opinion expected the recent Sino-Vietnamese talks to be a good success. But this did not seem to be the case. Would you please explain the reason why this round of talks failed to produce progress?

Answer: With the desire to bring about an early normalization of relations between Viet Nam and China and conclude the Cambodian problem through a comprehensive political solution, at the talks, we have demonstrated our utmost good will and always advanced first steps aimed at narrowing a gap between the two sides in the understanding regarding the essential issues of a solution to the Cambodian problem. The lack of progress is certainly due to some unsurmountable differences between the two countries. However, the two sides reached consensus on some fundamental points.

I want to talk about the unanimous points first, namely, the two sides agreed that the Cambodian issue must be solved by an overall political solution which includes the total and internationally verified withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, a cease-fire, the cessation of foreign military aids to all Cambodian parties, the holding of free, fair and democratic general elections under international control, and establishment of a future peaceful independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodian state having friendly relations with all other countries, particularly with close neighbours such as Viet Nam, China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand.

A number of differences still remain to be sorted out, mainly because the two sides held different views on the issues relating to Cambodia's internal affairs. The Chinese side demanded that Viet Nam agree with China on such merely internal Cambodian affairs as concrete functions and powers of the Supreme National Council and the measures to deal with the armed forces of all Cambodian parties after the enforcement of a cease-fire.

While we do not reject China's concrete proposals regarding Cambodia's internal affairs, Viet Nam is not in a position to represent the Cambodian parties in saying "yes" or "no", as it belongs totally to Cambodia's sovereignty. We clearly told China that Viet Nam is ready to join China and other countries in respecting the Cambodians' decision as far as the Cambodian parties go in accepting China's views.

Question 2: Mr. Xu Dunxin, the Chinese head delegate, mentioned about Viet Nam's intransigent position on the two remaining key issues and that it still demanded that the Khmer Rouge be excluded from the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. Is it true?

Answer: No, it is completely untrue.

Viet Nam welcomes the results gained in Tokyo, regarding them as an important step forward leading to a political solution to the Cambodia question. Regarding the question of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, we reaffirmed to the Chinese side that Viet Nam will respect the agreements reached in Tokyo between Cambodian factions on the composition of the Supreme National Council and fully agree on the principle that none of the Cambodian factions be excluded and that no Cambodian faction monopolizes the Supreme National Council. We proposed that China should convince the Khmer Rouge faction to take part in the cease-fire agreement and the establishment of the Supreme National Council. Regrettably, the Chinese side has not responded to our proposal, but held Viet Nam responsible for Chairman Hun Sen's signing the joint communiqué in Tokyo with Prince Sihanouk, saying that it meant the exclusion of a Cambodian faction, though it is known to everyone that Chairman Hun Sen called upon the Khmer Rouge to take part in the Supreme National Council and the cease-fire agreement, and it is the Khmer Rouge which has separated itself from the official agreements in Tokyo.

The Chinese side demanded that the Supreme National Council be the only authentic supreme authority organ in Cambodia in the transitional period, which must have the legislative and executive powers, and must directly control at least five most important ministries: national defence, interior, foreign affairs, information and finance, while other ministries and technical branches be managed by the two administrations but put under the guidance of the Supreme National Council. Viet Nam holds that this should be the concrete arrangement among the Cambodian factions themselves. We are of the view that Chairman Hun Sen previously rejected the establishment of a quadripartite coalition government and now he and Prince Sihanouk have agreed to establish a Supreme National Council comprising 12 members equally divided between the two present Cambodian administrations. Therefore, the Supreme National Council is not a quadripartite coalition government. However, the Chinese side still demands that the Supreme National Council have the power of a quadripartite coalition government. Viet Nam holds that the Supreme National Council has the responsibility and power in implementing agreements to be signed on Cambodia, national reconciliation and on organization of general elections. Viet Nam holds that the two existing administrations must refrain from doing anything to obstruct the responsibility and power of the Supreme National Council. It is the right of the Cambodian factions to decide how far they can accept China's ideas. Viet Nam's stance is to respect Cambodia's sovereignty and right to self-determination. Viet Nam and China cannot represent the Cambodian factions in handling Cambodia's internal affairs.

Question 3: What is the difference between the two sides with regard to the armed forces of the Cambodian factions?

Answer: With regard to the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, China urged Viet Nam to share its view that the Cambodian armed forces should regroup in places marked off by the United Nations and then their numbers would reduce to the lowest level. The Vietnamese side declared to respect the agreements reached by the Cambodian parties in Tokyo that the armed forces should stay where they were. Viet Nam put forth some principles concerning the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, namely, to put an early end to the civil war as early as possible, continue to

honour the cease-fire, and refrain from any interference in the Cambodian political life and general elections to assure general elections be held in a really free and equitable way. Concrete measures to be taken to realize these principles are to be decided by the Cambodian parties. Viet Nam, together with China and other countries, should respect decisions of the Cambodian parties.

Question 4: The Chinese side stated that Viet Nam did not want the United Nations to play its role. What is Viet Nam's view on the United Nations role in the Cambodian issue?

Answer: Viet Nam holds that the United Nations should play an important role in the settlement of the Cambodia problem on the basis of respect for the Cambodian sovereignty as in verification of the total Vietnamese army withdrawal, control and supervision of the implementation of other agreements in a comprehensive solution to the Cambodian conflict, including the termination of foreign interference and military aid, especially the control and supervision to assure freedom, fairness and democracy of the general elections. Besides, if the Cambodian parties agree together to assign the United Nations more tasks concerning Cambodia's sovereignty, Viet Nam will be ready together with other countries to honour it.

Question 5: Are there any discussions on the normalization of relations between the two countries at these informal talks?

Answer: The issue had been dealt with, although most of the time of the three-day meetings was focused on the Cambodian problem. The Chinese side once again affirmed that the normalization of its relations with Viet Nam could not come before but only after the settlement of the Cambodian problem, that only when the Cambodian problem is solved will China talk of the normalization of its relations with Viet Nam. That is the point where the policies pursued by China and by the Bush Administration meet.

In spite of difficulties, the Government and people of Viet Nam will consistently advocate the normalization of bilateral relations between Viet Nam and China, attaching importance to the long-term and fundamental interests of the two countries. This is also in the interest of durable peace and stability in South-East Asia and Asia.

Though no agreement was made on the timing of their next meeting, the two sides wished to continue consultations. This also conforms to the aspirations of the two peoples and public opinions.

Questions 6: What is the best measure, in your view, to conclude the transitional period in Cambodia?

Answer: It is really free, fair and democratic General elections, which must be organized under strict international control, as the ones held in a really free, really fair and really democratic way in Namibia and Nicaragua by their then existing administrations. In Namibia and Nicaragua, no time was wasted in argument about power in the transitional period. The decisive factor is to reach agreements on a law on general elections and on effective measures to make sure elections will

be really free, fair and democratic under effective control of international organizations. The questions of power of the Council and armed forces should not be taken in order to avoid discussions on that key issue.

If the Cambodian parties cannot reach any agreements on Cambodia's internal affairs, no outside force can replace the Cambodians to settle their affairs. In that case, measures should be taken neither to make the internal disputes of Cambodia an international issue nor to harm any country, and foreign countries must put an end to all acts of intervention and support for one side against the other. If the international community neutralizes Cambodia's internal disputes, all Cambodian parties will have to find measures to settle them soon.

Question 7: What is your comment on Xu Duxin's statement that Viet Nam showed no good will?

Answer: Viet Nam's unilateral troops pullout from Cambodia alone was a good will move, which has made an important contribution to settling the Cambodian issue. Has any country directly involved in the Cambodian issue unilaterally stopped its interference in Cambodia? Public opinion has pointed to China's persistent backing to the Polpotists as the main obstacle to a political solution of the Cambodian issue. China's remark that Viet Nam's refusal to settle Cambodia's internal affairs mainfests its lack of good will. However, we resolutely respect the principle of non-interference in Cambodia's internal affairs.

Question 8: Why does China now demand the 12-member Supreme National Council be shared among the four parties, not among the two Governments as it had agreed before, and why does it take a hard line on the power of the Supreme National Council and the armed forces?

Answer: China has a hard-line stance on the participation of the four parties in the Supreme National Council and armed forces because it wants both Viet Nam and China to have one stance contrary to the Tokyo Joint Communiqué. China has not approved of the Tokyo joint communiqué, and does not want to oppose it alone.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 32 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 2 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you a telefax dated 29 June 1990 addressed to you from Vice-President Khieu Samphan in charge of Foreign Affairs and President of the Democratic Kampuchea party, enclosing the proposal of the Democratic Kampuchea party for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem within the framework of the summary of conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 32 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Telefax dated 29 June 1990 from the Vice-President of Cambodia in charge of Foreign Affairs and President of the Democratic Kampuchea party to the Secretary-General

As a contribution to the search for a just and comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem nobly endeavoured by Your Excellency and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the Democratic Kampuchea party, a component of the National Government of Cambodia and the Cambodian National Resistance, put forward, on 29 June 1990, a proposal for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem within the framework of the Summary of Conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency a copy of the said proposal for your information and consideration.

(Signed) KHIEU Samphan
Vice-President of Cambodia in charge
of Foreign Affairs,
President of the Democratic Kampuchea party

Proposal dated 29 June 1990 of the Democratic Kampuchea party for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem within the framework of the summary of conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council

The Democratic Kampuchea party, like the National Government of Cambodia as a whole, has always expressed its sincere good will and has put forward successive proposals aimed at reaching as soon as possible a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem, which will restore peace and the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia within its territorial integrity, and safeguard the peace, security and stability of South-East Asia.

In this respect, the Democratic Kampuchea party has expresed its full support to the summary of conclusions of 26 May 1990 of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, especially their affirmation that "only a comprehensive political settlement will bring lasting peace and stability to Cambodia", and that "a comprehensive political settlement must include specific provisions as follows:

"(a) To ensure the verification of the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the cessation of external military assistance, a durable cease-fire, the regrouping of the armed forces of the factions into designated cantonment areas, all under the control of an effective United Nations peace-keeping operation;

"(b) To establish formally a supreme national council;

"(c) To ensure free and fair elections for a constituent assembly under United Nations auspices;

"(d) To enshrine the fundamental human rights and freedoms which the Cambodian people must enjoy, together with the necessary protections and guarantees;

"(e) To provide a system of guarantees for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia."

In the spirit of co-operation with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within the framework of their 26 May 1990 summary of conclusions, the Democratic Kampuchea party would like to put forward the following proposal for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian problem:

The objectives

1. To restore peace and the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia within its territorial integrity, free from foreign occupation.

2. To allow the people of Cambodia to exercise their sacred right to self-determination through free and fair elections.

The above-cited objectives can be attained only through a comprehensive political settlement, a simultaneous settlement of the external and internal aspects of the Cambodian problem, and under the control and verification of all the peace-keeping operations by the United Nations peace-keeping force.

* * *

Chapter I

CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM CAMBODIA

1. The United Nations peace-keeping force will control and supervise:

(a) The withdrawal from Cambodia of all categories of foreign forces and their weapons, and their non-return to the country.

The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia must be completed within 60 days from the date of the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

(b) The cease-fire.

The cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the warring forces throughout Cambodia 72 hours after the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

2. The United Nations peace-keeping force shall immediately set up their headquarters either in Phnom Penh or in Battambang or Siemreap, 72 hours after the cease-fire took effect (that is 144 hours after the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement), so as to start its mandate of control and verification of the implementation of the comprehensive Agreement, with the participation of the Vietnamese representatives and the representatives of the four Cambodian parties in the control and verification process.

* * *

Chapter II

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTERNAL ASPECT

I. MILITARY ASPECTS

In order to ensure a successful transition, prevent the outbresk of civil war and assure the internal security conducive to free and fair elections, there must be the United Nations peace-keeping force to control and verify:

1. The disarming and dissolution of all the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties;

The operations of disarming and dissolution of all the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

2. The cessation of outside military assistance to the four Cambodian parties.

3. The locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout the country.

II. THE INTERIM AUTHORITY

In order to restore peace and security in Cambodia and to enable the Cambodian people to exercise their sacred right to self-determination through free and fair elections, the co-operation between the United Nations and the four Cambodian parties is imperative. Therefore, it is necessary to set up a Cambodian quadripartite interim authority in which the four Cambodian parties shall be on equal footing. Only then can there be fairness, genuine national reconciliation and internal security in Cambodia.

1. The supreme interim authority during the transitional period shall be the Supreme National Council.

2. The Supreme National Council shall be the enshrinement of independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia.

3. H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk shall assume the Presidency of the Supreme National Council.

4. The Supreme National Council shall represent Cambodia at the United Nations and on the international arena, and run the affairs of the country.

5. There shall be the representatives of the four Cambodian parties, on equal footing, from top to bottom, in the Supreme National Council and all the ministries as well as at the provincial, district, commune and village levels.

6. The Supreme National Council shall co-operate with the United Nations and the United Nations peace-keeping force to ensure the respect and implementation of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.

7. The Supreme National Council shall have legislative powers and implement the adopted laws in a progressive manner from the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement and the United Nations verification and control through the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the adoption of the new Constitution and the formulation of a new national Government of Cambodia.

III. ELECTIONS

1. Free and fair elections shall be held within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement and under conditions where "no party would be advantaged". 1/

2. The basic principles on which the new Cambodian Constitution should be based, within the framework of a liberal democratic régime with many political parties, a parliament and a free market economy, shall be an integral part of a comprehensive political settlement.

3. The elections in Cambodia shall be held under the supervision of the United Nations.

4. The transitional period from the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement to the election day shall be specified.

5. Necessary measures must be taken for the holding of free and fair elections, including the establishment of electoral laws and regulations, the census of the population and the registration of voters.

6. All Cambodians should enjoy the same rights, freedoms and opportunities to participate in the election process. 2/

7. The Constituent Assembly resulting from the elections will draft and adopt the Constitution, and will transform itself into a legislative Assembly, which will create the new Government.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

Within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement, the four Cambodian parties shall accept the following measures:

1. To commit Cambodia to adhere to and implement the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international human rights instruments.

2. General human rights supervision of all aspects during the transitional period.

* * *

Chapter III

GUARANTEE OF THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INVIOLABILITY, NEUTRALITY AND NATIONAL UNITY OF CAMBODIA

In order to assure lasting peace, security and stability in Cambodia, it is essential to provide, within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement, a system of guarantees for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia.

In a comprehensive political settlement, the four Cambodian parties shall accept the following principles:

1. Cambodia will conduct a policy of independence, peace and non-alignment, and establish friendly relations with all countries based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

2. Cambodia will proclaim its perpetual neutrality.

3. Cambodia will never adhere to any military alliance or allow the installation of foreign military bases or forces on its territory.

4. The presence of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cambodia for a period of several years, with adequate means, to guarantee peace, security and stability in the country.

5. The guarantee by the United Nations of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia.

* * *

The present proposal contains three chapters (chap. I, chap. II and chap. III) which form an integral part of a comprehensive political settlement. Therefore, the three chapters will have to be implemented as a single and unique process from the start to the end, that is from the signing of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement through to the elections, the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the adoption of the Constitution, and the formation of a new national Government of Cambodia.

This proposal is aimed at putting an end to the Vietnamese war of aggression and occupation, securing the withdrawal of all categories of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, and allowing the four Cambodian conflicting parties to sit together and through their common efforts try their best to solve the problems until the adoption of the national Constitution and the formation of a national Government in Cambodia under which all Cambodians will live in harmony with each other.

Notes

1/ Summary of conclusions of the meeting of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in Paris on 15-16 January 1990. See document A/45/293-S/21318, pp. 2 and 3.

2/ Ibid.

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The attached letter, dated 2 July 1990, was addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations. In accordance with the request contained in the letter, the text is being circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

Letter dated 2 July 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you the text of information of 1 July 1990 of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side to the Korean Military Armistice Commission.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed information of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side to the Korean Military Armistice Commission, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

Enclosure

Information of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side to the Military Armistice Commission

1 July 1990

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed with the objective of ensuring "a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved".

In order to realize this objective, seven meetings of the Military Armistice Commission and seven Secretaries meetings (2 open-door and 5 closed-door meetings) were held in the last and this year (1 July 1989-30 June 1990).

The statements made at the meetings by the United Nations Command (UNC) side and its action clearly proved that it has no concern about the implementation of the Armistice Agreement, tension reduction and the maintenance of peace in Korea.

Stark contrast between both sides' position in the Military Armistice Commission meetings

On 14 July 1989, the 449th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at Panmunjom at the proposal of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV) side.

At the meeting, the KPA/CPV side strongly protested against the UNC side for its committing military provocations of deliberately infiltrating 65 naval vessels and other ships into the other side's territorial waters on 33 occasions and conducting gun firings against the other side on 21 occasions in the first half of the last year and demanded in strong terms that the UNC side should cease at once such Armistice Agreement violations of straining the situation on the Korean Peninsula and laying obstacles to the north-south dialogue.

The UNC side denied it with no reason.

On 8 August 1989, the 450th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at Panmunjom at the proposal of the KPA/CPV side.

At the meeting, the KPA/CPV side demanded that the UNC side not block the right to return home via Panmunjom of Rim Su Kyong, a delegate of the National Council of Student Representatives in south Korea who had participated in the thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students held at Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and of Father Mun Kyu Hyon but provide them with personal safeties and conveniences.

The issue of Panmunjom transit should be solved by the Military Armistice Commission in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and can be settled through negotiations.

/...

The UNC side, however, has doggedly opposed the Panmunjom transit by Rim Su Kyong and Father Mun Kyu Hyon.

Such unwarranted conduct on the part of the UNC side made their Panmunjom passage very difficult, making it impossible for them to return to their fellow students and parents and brothers, and put them behind bars to inflict heavy penalties.

On 12 September 1989, the 451st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at Panmunjom at the proposal of the KPA/CPV side.

Now over 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons of the United States have been introduced and deployed in south Korea and their total explosive power amounts to 13,000 kilotons, which is 1,000 times that of the A-bomb which the United States dropped over Hiroshima during the Second World War.

In addition to this, over 60 neutron bombs have been deployed there.

About 50,000 United States troops are stationed in south Korea.

Out of desire to save this situation, at the meeting, the KPA/CPV side called upon the UNC side to respond to withdrawing the United States troops stationed in south Korea and turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

The UNC side evaded this just demand of the KPA/CPV side and has failed so far to respond to it.

On 30 November 1989, the 452nd meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at Panmunjom at the proposal of the KPA/CPV side.

At the meeting, the KPA/CPV side presented to the UNC side a proposal for taking immediate measures for removing the danger of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.

The proposal involves the issues that:

First, both sides shall not conduct any kinds of military exercises to be staged by mobilizing nuclear weapons and equipment capable of carrying on or delivering nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula and in its surrounding waters from 1 January 1990;

Secondly, both sides shall not conduct large-scale military exercises to be participated in by a combined unit above and on the Korean Peninsula and in its surrounding waters;

Thirdly, both sides shall not conduct combined military exercises against the other side on the Korean Peninsula and in its surrounding waters as well as abroad.

This proposal of the KPA/CPV side was an affirmative one which fully accords with the preamble and subparagraphs 13 c and d of the Armistice Agreement.

The UNC side, however, refused to discuss the KPA/CPV side's proposal, saying that the issue of military exercises cannot be discussed at the Military Armistice Commission.

On 17 January 1990, the 453rd meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at Panmunjom at the proposal of the KPA/CPV side.

At the meeting, the KPA/CPV side protested against the UNC side in connection with the fact that the United States had announced that it would conduct with south Korea the "Team Spirit-90" joint military exercise, a nuclear war exercise against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and demanded that it discontinue military exercises involving nuclear war danger.

The UNC side failed to comply with this demand of the KPA/CPV side and conducted the provocative "Team Spirit-90" joint military exercise during the period from the end of January to the end of April, straining to the extreme the situation on the Korean Peninsula and throwing a wet blanket over the north-south dialogue to suspend it.

On 2 February 1990, the 454th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at Panmunjom at the proposal of the KPA/CPV side.

At the meeting, the KPA/CPV side protested against the UNC side for the fact that the south Korean authorities had erected a concrete wall along the military demarcation line, covering nearly 250 kilometres, to bisect three railroads, four big rivers and over 150 big and small roads, thus severing the national ties, and presented the issue of pulling down the barrier, a symbol of division and confrontation and realizing free travel and full-scale open door.

The UNC side, at first, insisted that there was no concrete wall. But when it could not hide the stern fact, shown in the detailed pictures of the concrete wall and the video showing the concrete wall running across Paju County, Ryonchon County, Cholwon County, Rinje County, Yanggu County and Kosong County, which are contiguous to the military demarcation line, it admitted that the concrete wall had been erected in the south of the military demarcation line but failed to answer that it would pull down the wall.

On 14 March 1990, the 455th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission was held at Panmunjom at the proposal of the KPA/CPV side.

At the meeting, the KPA/CPV side stated that the south side had fabricated a so-called "fourth tunnel", hatching various other plots in an attempt forcibly to associate it with the KPA/CPV side, and proposed to the UNC side that, to clarify it, 60 personnel including the Senior Member of the KPA/CPV side, Joint Observer Team members, concerned officers of the KPA/CPV side to the Military Armistice Commission, experts and pressmen would enter, in four helicopters, the demilitarized zone where the "fourth tunnel" was alleged to have been found to conduct an extensive on-the-spot investigation, together with the necessary number of other assistants.

The UNC side, however, refused to accept the proposal of the KPA/CPV side.

The UNC failure to accept the KPA/CPV fair and reasonable proposal revealed that the so-called "fourth tunnel" which the UNC side talked about was a fabrication and a deceptive farce.

Five closed-door Secretaries meetings were held to discuss security arrangements in the joint security area, Panmunjom, during the period from July 1989 to the end of May 1990.

At the meetings, the KPA/CPV side presented the issue of reducing the number of security guards, disarming them and removing military installations from the joint security area, Panmunjom, in order to ensure perfect security in the area where the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) are working and multi-channelled north-south dialogues are being held.

The UNC side, however, has been rejecting it, saying that "it cannot accept it at present".

All the facts explicitly prove that the UNC has no actual concern about tension reduction and peace on the Korean Peninsula though it has been talking about the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and confidence building.

Armistice Agreement violations by the United Nations Command side

The UNC side has kept on committing military provocations and hostile acts against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in flagrant violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

Armistice Agreement violations on the ground

Paragraph 6 of the Armistice Agreement prescribes that neither side "shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone" and paragraph 14 thereof prescribes that "ground forces shall respect the DMZ and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side".

The UNC side fired heavy and automatic gun-fire towards the posts of the Korean People's Army and the area of peaceable inhabitants in the north of the military demarcation line in flagrant violation of those requirements of the Armistice Agreement.

At about 2035 hours on 2 August 1989, the south Korean army abruptly fired several rounds of automatic gun-fire, including tracers, in the vicinity of a place 450 metres south-east of military demarcation line marker No. 1127 in the eastern front towards the Korean People's Army posts opposite.

At about 2020 hours on 24 November 1989, the south Korean army fired several rounds of automatic gun-fire from the vicinity of a spot approximately 1,000 metres south-east of military demarcation line marker No. 0350 in the western front towards the Korean People's Army posts and populated area opposite.

At about 1000 hours on 25 November 1989, the south Korean army abruptly conducted gun firing with a large-calibre machine-gun at a spot approximately 600 metres south of military demarcation line marker No. 0721 in the eastern front towards the Korean People's Army post opposite.

At about 0900 hours on 24 December 1989, the south Korean army fired several automatic rifle shots from the vicinity of a spot 1,100 metres south of the military demarcation line marker No. 0666 in the central front towards the Korean People's Army post opposite.

The south Korean army continued to commit similar armed provocations in 1990 as well.

The south Korean army fired automatic rifles and large-calibre machine-guns from the vicinity of military demarcation line marker No. 0026 in the western section of the front at about 1655 hours on 14 January, from the vicinity of a spot 600 metres south of military demarcation line marker No. 1071 in the eastern section of the front at about 1545 hours on 25 February, and from the vicinity of a spot 50 metres south of military demarcation line marker No. 0804 in the central section of the front between about 1600 hours and 1625 hours on 20 April respectively towards the Korean People's Army posts to commit the military provocations of seriously endangering the personal safety of the Korean People's Army forces on their routine duty and destroying their posts.

Armistice Agreement violations at sea

Paragraph 15 of the Korean Armistice Agreement stipulates that "... naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side".

However, the UNC side violated this requirement of the Armistice Agreement.

At about 1303 hours on 16 November 1989, the UNC side infiltrated high-speed boats of the south Korean forces into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea south-west of Changsangot in the West Sea to commit espionage and hostile acts and the boats fled to the south when the Korean People's Army naval patrol boat was sent.

The UNC side intruded a combat vessel of the south Korean forces into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea west of Changsangot in the West Sea at about 1042 hours on 2 February 1990.

The UNC side committed a hostile act of dispatching a south Korean force's combat vessel deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea north-west of Changsangot in the West Sea at about 1422 hours on 15 May 1990 and infiltrated two other combat vessels deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea off Changsangot between about 1444 hours and 1452 hours to commit a military provocation.

Armistice Agreement violations in the air

Paragraph 16 of the Korean Armistice Agreement prescribes that "... air forces shall respect the air space over the demilitarized zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side".

The UNC side committed espionage and hostile acts by systematically flying military aircraft into the territorial airspace and the air over the coastal waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in wanton violation of the requirement of the Armistice Agreement.

At about 1055 hours on 23 October 1989, the UNC side committed the provocation of intruding two fighters to the airspace over the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

At about 1410 hours on 22 November 1989, the UNC side committed the criminal act of infiltrating an armed helicopter into the DMZ east of military demarcation line marker No. 0270 in the western sector of the front.

At about 1425 hours on 18 December, the UNC side committed the hostile act of dispatching two armed helicopters to the DMZ south-west of military demarcation line marker No. 0697.

The air intrusion and espionage acts by the UNC side have increased sharply this year, especially during the joint military exercise "Team Spirit-90".

The number of espionage acts by different kinds of reconnaissance planes amounted to as many as 170-odd cases during the month of February when the United States armed forces to be mobilized to the joint military exercise "Team Spirit-90" were moved to and deployed in the Korean Peninsula.

The number of Armistice Agreement violations committed by the UNC side on the ground, in the air and at sea, which were protested against by the KPA/CPV side, amounts to as many as 18,000-odd cases.

Arms reinforcement by the UNC side

Subparagraphs 13 c and d of the Korean Armistice Agreement prohibit "the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel" and "the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons and ammunition".

In wanton violation of these requirements of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC side continues to reinforce its armed forces in south Korea where more than 1,000 nuclear weapons and over 60 neutron bombs have already been introduced.

The United States plans to transfer 120 new-type jet fighters to the south Korean army and has already transferred to south Korea multi-purpose medium-/long-range "C-130" transport planes capable of quickly transporting a lot of combat equipment and forces.

The United States is going to introduce a number of "M-1 Abrams Super tanks" and deploy them in the areas near the military demarcation line for the ground battle of the United States troops in south Korea. The first cargo ship carrying the new-type tanks already entered Pusan port at the end of 1989.

At the end of last March the United States replaced "M-60 A3" heavy tanks of the tank battalions belonging to the United States Second Infantry Division occupying south Korea with more than 120 "M-1" sophisticated tanks which were newly introduced from the continental United States.

The United States plans to organize a new air unit with 25 "F-16" fighter bombers at Osan Air base during upcoming July and August.

The United States has already made it public that "F-4" fighters at Osan and other bases would be replaced with "F-16" fighter bombers in fiscal year 1990 and is going to introduce into south Korea "F-15 Es" whose sphere of activity is larger than "F-16" fighter bombers.

Some time ago, United States Pacific Air Forces Commander General McPeak testified that a plan has been mapped out to deploy in south Korea an additional squadron of "F-16" fighters capable of flying low at night and equipped with infrared target detecting apparatuses.

Such arms reinforcement of the United States side proves that its vociferous "détente" and "disarmament" are falsities and that it desperately pursues only confrontation and war.

War exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Paragraph 12 of the Korean Armistice Agreement stipulates for "a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces" and subparagraphs 13 c and d thereof prescribes for the cessation of the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel and combat equipment.

The UNC side has been ceaselessly conducting military exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in disregard of the aforesaid requirement of the Armistice Agreement.

Typical is the United States-south Korea joint military exercise code-named "Team Spirit".

The military exercise, the fourteenth in its series conducted in south Korea in 1990, was a nuclear war exercise against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, like the previous ones.

The "Team Spirit-90" joint military exercise was conducted between January and April by mobilizing large forces, about 200,000 strong.

For this war exercise, the United States introduced into south Korea "E-3A" early warning aircraft, "B-52" strategic bombers, "F-16" and "F-15" fighter

bombers, aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers and various kinds of combat vessels and other sophisticated combat equipment and mass-destruction weapons from the United States bases in the continental United States, Guam, Hawaii, Japan and the Philippines.

The "Team Spirit" joint military exercises conducted every year by the United States side in south Korea and its surrounding waters by introducing a lot of military personnel and armed equipment constitute serious violations of the Armistice Agreement and only served to strain the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the extreme.

And the south Korean authorities are conducting almost every day war exercises such as "Myolgong", "Piho", "Pangpae", "Ttangbol" and so on.

In connection with such war manoeuvrings of the UNC side, the KPA/CPV side took every opportunity to make proposals to the United States side, including the issue of restricting military exercises of both sides alike, the issue of ceasing war exercises involving the danger of nuclear war and the like.

However, the UNC side is conducting in succession war exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea disregarding them.

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Today the situation on the Korean Peninsula is still tense and war danger is hanging over it at all times.

United States Secretary of Defence Cheney said that if there was any place where a conflict could develop into a war on the globe at present, that was the Korean Peninsula and that a conflict might be caused on the Korean Peninsula. In his press interview with radio reporter Carl Ford of "Voice of America", a deputy assistant secretary of defence in charge of Asian affairs said that if a war broke out in the Korean Peninsula the United States troops would participate in the war as they practised through the joint exercises.

Their words indicate what stage the war danger reached on the Korean Peninsula.

It is the stern demand of the present time and the unanimous desire of mankind to prevent war and safeguard peace.

Anyone who really values peace and has concern about the destiny of mankind, no matter where and what he may do, should turn out to the struggle for opposing war and defending peace and should not turn his face away from the grave situation created on the Korean Peninsula.

The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side to the Military Armistice Commission expresses its firm conviction that the States Members of the United Nations that value peace and strive for peace will render in the future too as in the past firm solidarity with our sincere efforts to realize Korea's reunification by easing tension and realizing disarmament on the Korean Peninsula.